Frozen embryos are not property, judge rules

Key Takeaways

• A Virginia judge ruled that frozen embryos are not property and cannot be divided like goods.
• The decision overturns an earlier controversial ruling that referenced 19th-century slave law.
• The case highlights a growing national debate over the legal status of embryos and fetal personhood.

Virginia judge rules 

A Virginia judge has ruled that frozen embryos cannot be considered property that can be divided in legal disputes, rejecting an earlier court analysis that suggested they could be treated as "goods or chattel" under outdated laws.

The ruling was issued by Fairfax Circuit Court Judge Dontaè L. Bugg, who dismissed a lawsuit by Honeyhline Heidemann, a cancer survivor who sought access to two embryos she and her ex-husband, Jason Heidemann, had frozen during a 2015 in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycle. The couple agreed to leave the embryos in storage during their 2018 divorce, but the legal battle began when Honeyhline sued for ownership.

A case with national implications

The dispute drew national attention in 2023 when Judge Richard E. Gardiner, then presiding over the case, referenced slave-era laws when considering whether Virginia's property division statutes applied to embryos. Judge Bugg, in his March 7 ruling, strongly rejected that reasoning, stating that embryos should not be subject to partition or sale under modern legal standards.

“Virginia lawmakers have since 1865 removed references to slavery to excise a lawless blight from the Virginia Code,” Bugg wrote in his decision.

The ruling also comes at a time of increasing legal debate over fetal personhood. In 2024, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that frozen embryos are people, sparking legal and political battles over IVF rights and reproductive healthcare. That same year, U.S. Senate Republicans blocked a bill that sought to federally protect IVF access, deepening the nationwide controversy.

Arguments from both sides

During the trial, Honeyhline Heidemann testified that the embryos were her last chance to conceive another biological child after undergoing cancer treatment. She hoped the judge would grant her full access to them, but was also willing to accept a ruling that divided the embryos between her and her ex-husband.

Jason Heidemann opposed her claim, arguing that he should not be forced into biological parenthood against his will. His legal team contended that no law supported the idea of treating embryos as divisible property and pointed to ethical concerns about the sale or valuation of fertilized eggs.

The judge’s final decision

In his ruling, Judge Bugg dismissed the case, stating there was no precedent or legal basis for treating embryos as property. He also questioned the practicality and ethics of assigning value to embryos in legal disputes.

“It is obvious that these two human embryos, if implanted and carried to term, would not result in the same two people,” Bugg wrote. “In fact, the embryos are as unique as any two people that may be selected from the population.”

This case leaves Virginia without clear legal precedent on the treatment of embryos in divorce disputes, but it aligns with a broader national debate on how the law should define fetal personhood and reproductive rights in the wake of landmark court rulings.